Communications of the Association for Information Systems
Volume 29

Article 21

11-2011

Toys Become Tools: From Virtual Worlds to Real
Commerce
Sascha Vitzthum
Department of Business Administration, Illinois Wesleyan University, svitzthu@iwu.edu

Abhishek Kathuria
Goizueta Business School, Emory University

Benn Konsynski
Goizueta Business School, Emory University

Follow this and additional works at: https://aisel.aisnet.org/cais
Recommended Citation
Vitzthum, Sascha; Kathuria, Abhishek; and Konsynski, Benn (2011) "Toys Become Tools: From Virtual Worlds to Real Commerce,"
Communications of the Association for Information Systems: Vol. 29 , Article 21.
DOI: 10.17705/1CAIS.02921
Available at: https://aisel.aisnet.org/cais/vol29/iss1/21

This material is brought to you by the AIS Journals at AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). It has been accepted for inclusion in Communications of the
Association for Information Systems by an authorized administrator of AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). For more information, please contact
elibrary@aisnet.org.

Toys Become Tools: From Virtual Worlds to Real Commerce

Sascha Vitzthum
Department of Business Administration, Illinois Wesleyan University
svitzthu@iwu.edu

Abhishek Kathuria
Goizueta Business School, Emory University

Benn Konsynski
Goizueta Business School, Emory University

This teaching case considers the challenges and opportunities faced by an entrepreneur in Second Life, one of the
more popular virtual world environments. Second Life provides the economic and technological platform required for
immersion, social interaction, and the potential of private enterprise. Many entrepreneurs have taken advantage of
the various business opportunities offered in Second Life, and a number have earned significant income through
their in-world creations and services. Stuart O'Brian, the CEO and founder of VirtualCircle, was one of the early
pioneers of virtual commerce. Over the last three years, his organization faced multiple business and technology
challenges while negotiating the hypercompetitive and turbulent environment within Second Life. However, he now
questions the sustainability of the ever-changing and agile business model that enabled the success of VirtualCircle.
Stuart also faces questions regarding avenues of future growth and is grappling with issues concerning
interoperability and the replication of his prior success in other virtual environments—and the real world.
Keywords: agile enterprises, digital options, turbulent environments, IS platform, virtual commerce, virtual
organizations, virtual teams, second life, virtual worlds, immersion
Editor’s Note: A teaching note for this case can be obtained from svitzthu@iwu.edu. Only active faculty who are
currently listed in the AIS Faculty Directory are eligible to receive the teaching note.

Volume 29, Article 21, pp. 379-394, November 2011
The manuscript was received 10/24/2010 and was with the authors 6 months for 1 revision.

Volume 29

Article 21

Toys Become Tools: From Virtual Worlds to Real Commerce

The default assumption of your mind, unless you fight against it, is that everything in an immersive
game world is completely real [Castronova, 2005].

I. INTRODUCTION
As he scanned the island, taking in the familiar surroundings for one last time, Stanley’s thoughts strayed to the
travails of the recent past, and waves of nostalgia washed over him. He could hear the surf pounding on the rocks
and see the sun setting beyond the expanse of the horizon. He could almost taste the salt in the air and smell the
green grass below his feet. Almost being the operative word; because none of this was real. It was all a
kaleidoscope of 0s and 1s, made possible by the marvels of modern technology. The sun, the beach, the houses,
the people, and even Stanley Orsk Barrowstone himself were all unreal. But his feelings, his experiences, his
successes, and the money he had made were all very much real.
Stuart O’Brian, the alter ego of Stanley, was an entrepreneurial pioneer—an entrepreneur who in early 2009 was
making real money from engaging in real commerce in a virtual world. He had sensed the business opportunities
offered by his passion and pastime, Second Life (SL), and carved a niche for him in the micro-economy of this virtual
world. Over the past three years, he had witnessed many tumultuous events that created new business
opportunities induced by continuously evolving rules and regulations in SL. And yet, he and his company
VirtualCircle (VC) had not just survived, but thrived and prospered well beyond his initial expectations. His business
model of having an adaptive business had seen him through ups and downs and had led him through a succession
of roles: gathering spot creator, land developer, retailer, service-system provider, and market facilitator. VC had
established a brand presence in SL and was a well-known retailer of fashionable virtual goods and accessories.
Stuart’s growing network of stores, vending machines, and sales affiliates had contributed toward a trajectory of
growing revenues and profits. Despite these successes, he was worried about where the next business
opportunities would come from and if they would be as successful as the earlier ones. He was concerned about the
sustainability of a continually adapting business and avenues of future growth. He wondered what it was in his
business model that had led to his success in SL and whether that success could be replicated in another virtual
world. Could his intricate knowledge of the SL platform and experience with virtual commerce be utilized to expand
VC beyond the boundaries of SL, or even other virtual worlds and into the real world itself? Were the learnings from
the hypercompetitive and turbulent environment of SL applicable beyond its realms?
Stuart O’Brian pondered over these questions as he used his mouse and keyboard to guide Stanley along the shore
of his company’s latest sale, Patailani—an island that had been one of his earliest developments. Reminiscences of
his entrepreneurial journey made him wonder what lay in store for him and his constantly adapting company.

II. VIRTUAL WORLDS1
Virtual Worlds are immersive, interactive, persistent online environments that provide their participants with a gamelike, role-playing, and concurrent experience. Virtual worlds provide a sense of identity within a space and enable
participants to use their online persona to engage in a variety of activities, including socialization, education,
commerce, entertainment, collaboration, exploration, and creation. Thus, virtual worlds consist of online personas,
spaces, the creations of online personas, and the interactions of these three.
The first 2-D virtual worlds (e.g., ImagiNation Network and The Palace) were born in the early 1990s, and most were
shut down by 2001. Some of the early immersive virtual worlds, which were established in the mid-1990s, were still
active in the late 2000s (e.g., Active Worlds). Many truly massive and immersive virtual worlds (e.g., Second Life
and Entropia Universe) emerged at the dawn of the twenty-first century [Bray and Konsynski, 2006]. Some virtual
worlds were game focused (e.g., World of Warcraft), whereas others focused on socialization of specific (e.g.,
Habbo Hotel) or all types of participants (e.g., SL). Some virtual worlds also facilitated education or served as a
meeting place for geographically distributed participants. For example, corporations such as IBM had created virtual
meeting and
rooms
in SL.
Many
virtual Worlds
worlds enabled
participants to engage in commercial
Toystraining
Become
Tools:
From
Virtual
to Realtheir
Commerce
transactions of spaces (e.g., property in SL) and creations (e.g., virtual goods in SL). Real-world companies
attempted to tap into these rapidly growing economies within virtual worlds by offering a virtual shopping experience.
1

Refer to Castronova, 2005; Bray, 2006; Bray and Konsynski, 2007, for an overview of virtual worlds, their history, and limitations.
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Virtual worlds consisted of a main application hosted on a set of servers, which were accessed via either a standard
Web browser or proprietary client software. There were several pricing models for virtual worlds: Some providers
distributed free software clients and did not charge for their use, while other providers charged an upfront fee for the
client, and others required subscription fees for access. Some virtual worlds offered free download of their client
applications and free access along with subscription-based premium offerings. The short history of virtual worlds
was replete with these and other complex pricing models as virtual world providers grappled with the challenges of
monetizing their investments.

Brief History of Virtual Worlds
In 1991, Sierra On-Line launched a subscription-based 2-D online gaming network, named ImagiNation Network
(INN). INN was comprised of multiple lands and featured different games and services, including an electronic post
office, bulletin boards, and chat rooms. The online personas of participants were assembled using a built-in face
maker. INN was partly sold to AT&T and eventually acquired in 1996 by America On-Line, which later shut it down.
Another early pioneer was The Palace. It was a 2-D interactive chat application which featured emoticon-shaped
avatars which could chat with one another and move from one room to another by clicking on doors. Launched in
1994, The Palace was quietly shelved in 2001.
Some of the early immersive virtual worlds, which were established in the mid-1990s survived for a longer time.
Active Worlds originally was envisioned as a 3-D web browser. It was re-launched as a 3-D platform in 1995 and
was still active both as a paid and a free service in the late 2000s. In 1998, There was launched as a subscriptionbased 3-D virtual world with 2-D web-based services [Bray and Konsynski, 2006]. There had a virtual economy of
member-created items and offered free and paid membership.
The dawn of the twenty-first century saw the emergence of many truly massive and immersive virtual worlds. In
2003, Electronic Arts, a giant in the computer game industry, launched the subscription based The Sims Online
(TSO). TSO was an online version of the highly successful game franchise, The Sims. Participants were allowed to
control up to three simulated persons, or Sims, across three different game servers. TSO also featured an online
currency and virtual economy. However, TSO was unable to replicate the runaway commercial success associated
with the The Sims PC games and was not updated after 2005.
In 2003, Linden Lab launched SL on a partly subscription-based model. Around the same time, MindArk, a Swedish
software firm, launched Entropia Universe (EU). Both SL and EU had their own virtual currency and virtual economy.
SL provided its participants, termed Residents, with the ability to create or modify the SL world and the objects within
it. Residents were allowed to retain the intellectual property rights over their in-world creations and buy and sell
these creations.

Limitations of Virtual Worlds
Wide-scale adoption of virtual worlds was inhibited by several limitations. Chief among these was the proprietary
and closed natures of virtual worlds. Virtual worlds were developed as silos, many with proprietary code and
rendering technologies; thus they lacked interoperability. Personas and their belongings in one world could not be
ported to another world. Security, functionality, and digital rights management issues needed to be resolved before
inter-world portability could be implemented across multiple virtual worlds. The proprietary nature of the underlying
code and rendering technologies of most virtual worlds further increased interconnectivity complexities and resulted
in duplication of development effort and multiple technical problems. Lack of good documentation on the proprietary
application programming interfaces (APIs) of different virtual worlds also contributed to the closed nature of virtual
worlds. Efforts aimed at developing open standards and open source platforms such as OpenSim had been initiated
in the mid 2000s, but had yet to gain widespread support. Thus, a multiverse, a network of interoperable and
connected virtual worlds, was nothing more than a bold vision.
Another limitation was the hardware and bandwidth requirements on both the virtual world provider and user ends,
due to the demands of providing more realistic graphics. Concentration of multiple online personas in a given space
further increased the load on hardware. This compromised the ability of virtual worlds to support gatherings of more
than a few dozen people, such as conferences, conventions, and concerts, and hence severely limited their adoption
by a larger audience. A recent approach was to utilize peer to peer technology to cope with the processing power
requirements. While companies such as NICTA offered peer-to-peer technology-based distributed solutions, only a
few of the prominent virtual worlds adopted this technology [Naone, 2008]. Legal and cultural issues arising from the
global reach of virtual worlds also dimmed their appeal to certain audiences. Issues of jurisdiction, governmental
regulation, language barriers, and self-aggregation of similar people were some other issues faced by virtual worlds.
Despite these limitations, virtual worlds had the potential to transform many aspects of human life, including
education, business, social events, corporate meetings, social networking, and e-commerce [Bray and Konsynski,
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2007]. By early 2009, many virtual worlds had populations and economies that were larger than those of some small
countries.

III. SECOND LIFE
Linden Lab (LL) was incorporated in 1999, with an aim to develop virtual immersion hardware which would allow
users to immerse themselves in a virtual world experience. A software application, named Linden World, was
developed to go along with the hardware and was eventually launched as SL, after alpha and beta trials, in June
2003. SL was developed as much more than a mere game or chat application. In an April 2006 blog post, Philip
Linden (the SL persona of Philip Rosedale, the founder of SL) commented:
I’m not a gamer, and SL isn’t a game. From the start, we/LL observed that something like SL would have
its first uses in entertainment, and then grow beyond those uses as people became more confident in the
capabilities of the new platform/OS/whatever-we-want-to-call-it. So we focused on making SL very
exciting and visceral and inspirational, but not on making it a game [Linden, 2006].
Unlike games, SL did not have rules or objectives, and, unlike chat applications, it consisted of an extensive world to
be explored and interacted with. The world was designed on a real-world template, wherein participants’ online
personas, called avatars (a Sanskrit word meaning incarnation), were placed under almost realistic environmental
constraints. Andrew Linden, the avatar of a SL developer explained this in a March 2005 blog post:
Way back when we started working on SL we talked about the fundamental design of what the space
should look like. There were all sorts of freedoms that could be explored in a virtual space—no need for
gravity, ground, sky, water, or trees. However, we decided we wanted SL to be very much a place rather
than an abstract collaborative CAD tool. Since the humans are most familiar with an environment that has
a horizon, ground, sky, water, and trees we decided that SL would be fundamentally familiar if it had
these things. Similarly we decided to center the avatar possibility space around a realistically human
shape instead of a cartoony or otherwise stylized avatar [Linden, 2005].
SL avatars could take any animal, vegetable, or mineral form that users chose, including resembling the users
themselves. Users could change the appearance and form of their avatars as they wished and could also have
multiple avatars. SL residents used to refer to the state of being present in the SL world or anything that took place
within SL as in-world. SL was conceived as a largely user-created, highly scalable environment. LL did not charge
users for creating an account or for making use of the world. LL did offer a premium membership that provided a
higher level of technical support and an in-world stipend. Philip Rosedale grasped the potential of collaborative
creation early on and reoriented SL from an objective-driven, gaming experience to a community driven, usercreated experience. He later remarked:
… we want SL to be able to reach everyone in the world, to be able to scale to 100’s of millions of users and
millions of servers, and to remain an open decentralized system in which creativity rules [Linden, 2006].

Business Model
The primary business model of SL revolved around virtual land. Ownership of land within SL bestowed on its owner
the ability to store or showcase creations and build offices, residences, or any other buildings. A subscription-based
premium membership gave participants the right to own any of the four types of land regions available in SL:
Mainland, Private Region, Homestead, and Openspace. Each region was hosted on an individual CPU and
comprised of an area of 65,536m². LL tightly controlled the overall supply of land within SL. Residents could
purchase regions sold by LL through auctions or could purchase or rent smaller parcels of land from other
participants. The owner of land had to pay monthly upkeep fees, which were determined by the size of the plot, to LL
2
and could use the land for any purpose not prohibited by the SL’s Terms of Service. Ownership of land would cease
if a participant failed to pay monthly dues to LL.
LL provided residents with the virtual space within which they could store their creations. In November 2003, LL
allowed residents to retain the intellectual property rights over their in-world creations. Residents had four basic
choices to copyright their objects. Objects could be freely resold or given away, copied for personal use, modified, or
remain unchanged. This decision to enable copyrights and ownership of digital creations made LL the provider of a
platform for creativity, where residents could engage in commercial activities regarding their creations. These
commercial activities were facilitated by the SL virtual currency, Linden Dollars (L$), which had a market determined
floating exchange rate with real U.S. dollars (USD). The exchange created a secondary revenue stream for LL,
which collected a 3.5 percent fee for converting L$ into real world currency. Beginning with the first quarter of 2007,
2

The SL terms of service are available at http://secondlife.com/corporate/tos.php.
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more than USD 10 million were exchanged per quarter. In the last quarter of 2008 nearly 30 USD million were
exchanged, leading to nearly USD 1 million in conversion fees.
LL thus had a commercial interest in attracting two types of users: premium members who would develop land, and
thus contribute membership and land usage fees, and users who would spend on in-world purchases of goods and
services. While premium memberships slowly declined in 2008 to 80,000, the total amount of land owned by SL
2
residents increased to 6000 km , foreshadowing a consolidation among land owners. At the same time, the value of
in-world commercial transactions increased tremendously, which resulted in rising revenues from currency
conversion fees. LL controlled both the land and the L$ supply in SL. Changes in both directly impacted LL’s
revenues in the short term. Yet, oversupply of either would lead to devaluation of the assets of users and premium
account holders, which could easily lead to residents leaving SL for good (see Appendix B).
SL had started as a virtual space for creativity, but had developed into a micro-economy. It was LL’s core business
challenge to make both governance and technical decisions that would satisfy all stakeholders, while at the same
time warranting positive cash flows for the company.

In-World Economy
By October 2006, over 1 million accounts had been registered in SL. However, not all registered residents were
active. It was estimated that less than 10 percent of newly signed up users would return within thirty days after they
had initially signed up. Several factors contributed to the low retention rate: First, users had difficulties with the SL
interface. While most managed to create an avatar, few were able to find or interact with other avatars. In addition,
the lack of a defined objective, similar to quests in popular massively multiplayer online role-playing games
(MMORPGs), led to users not returning to SL.
Still, from the end of 2006, SL usage started to grow. One reason was the increased media coverage of SL. Outlets
such as BusinessWeek and the German Bildzeitung started reporting on SL, and Reuters decided to have a
dedicated news bureau that would report only on the developments in SL and other virtual worlds. The increased
coverage not only drew in more casual users but also spurred the interest of entrepreneurs. The intense reporting on
Anshe Chung’s success as the first self-made USD millionaire in SL only added to that movement. The influx of new
residents created new demands in the in-world economy. Users wanted to express themselves, but often lacked the
skills or time to create virtual goods or accessories on their own. Just as in the real world, residents started to buy
virtual goods from other residents who had specialized in designing and creating objects. However, the amount of
virtual goods that residents could have on display at any time was limited by the amount of land over which they
owned usage rights. Since the subscription-based premium membership was a prerequisite to land ownership, but
not land rental, this created a class structure within SL and promoted a lucrative land-rental market. The exchange
of virtual goods along with the commissioned development of real estate and subsequent land rentals were credited
with the first significant economic spike in SL. User-to-user transactions in the fourth quarter of 2006 increased by 75
percent compared to the previous quarter.
After establishing their virtual identity by creating an individual space and purchasing or creating virtual goods, many
residents sought to showcase their belongings and find like-minded peers. Thus, gathering spots, built by the early
entrepreneurs, became increasingly popular. Popular venues included coffee shops, night clubs, and resorts.
However, most of those venues did not have a clear-cut business model to monetize on their popularity. Some
operators tried a subscription model, but often failed to retain paying customers who would just move on to free
alternatives. Advertising within the gathering spots was another attempt to capitalize on the popularity of venues. But
similar to the early days of online advertising, few operators were able to provide measures of success of advertising
beyond the number of residents that had gathered in a particular space at a particular time.
Despite the meager returns of the initial entertainment services, entrepreneurs soon found an economically viable
niche. Virtual gambling became a huge success in the first half of 2007. The provision of gambling services and the
transfer of funds to and from gambling service providers was heavily regulated in the U.S. However, U.S. law had
yet to include virtual worlds in this ban. Thus, virtual gambling became an alternative welcomed by many users.
Within six months, user-to-user transactions tripled in SL, peaking at above L$ 9 billion in the second quarter of
2007. This was due in no small part to the revenue generated by gambling services. Despite this success, LL
decided to ban gambling in SL because of the legal uncertainty. The decline of user-to-user transactions to less than
L$ 6 billion in the last quarter of 2007 was a direct result of this ban, leading to the first recession in SL. Yet, usage
of SL increased to 80 million hours, making it an interesting place for real-world businesses to promote their realworld products (see Appendix B).
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Real-World Institutions Move into SL
By early 2009, many real world institutions had established a presence in SL. Some confined their activities to inworld advertising and brand building. Other institutions offered their real-world products and services through SL.
Some organizations attempted to tap into the collaboration potential of SL and used it as a virtual meeting place.
More ambitious firms integrated SL into their overall business model and presented SL variants of their real-life
offerings. For example, an architectural firm called Crescendo Design built model homes in SL, which it then
integrated with its website. This enabled the company to provide virtual tours of homes to its potential customers.
Similarly, Starwood Hotels built and tested a digital prototype for a new hotel chain. Dell developed an island in SL
for use as a meeting spot for its employees and interaction with its customers [Dell, 2009]. It promoted a cross-world
sales model where visitors to the Dell island could configure a new computer and then be routed to the Dell website
for payment. The computer would then be delivered to the SL user at their real-world address. Other real-world
institutions with a brand presence in SL included American Apparel, Coldwell Banker, and Nissan. In a brandbuilding exercise, the Weather Channel created weather-related sports activities across a series of SL islands.
Cisco, Generali Group, IBM, and Microsoft were other organizations that attempted to use SL for meetings. Many
universities and government institutions also used SL for its meeting capabilities. Early SL adopters expected SL to
act as a substitute for face-to-face meetings. However, some of their efforts were stymied by the population
concentration constraints of SL. Some companies moved away from SL to more controlled worlds like There to
avoid association with controversial elements.
The initial failures of real-world institutions’ efforts to adapt to SL created a demand for the services of virtual
consultants. These in-world service providers had successfully promoted their own virtual offerings and thus were in
a position to offer insights into the idiosyncrasies of the SL economy, resident behavior, and the SL platform. Realworld institutions that relied on the services provided by these consultants realized that mere replication of real-world
products and processes was not a sustainable strategy in SL. Companies like Apez, Electric Sheep, and Hippo
provided distribution, record keeping, and communication systems which facilitated virtual commerce. They also
enabled their clients to offer incentives to their virtual customers for purchasing real goods. Aimee Weber Studio was
another successful inter-world business that combined real-world and virtual-world activities. Run by designer and
artist, Aimee Weber, it designed virtual products in SL for many real-world institutions, which included the United
Nations, American Cancer Society, and Ohio University. It also provided virtual marketing, project management, and
video production services and had an acclaimed virtual fashion clothing line.
These in-world service providers had developed enormous expertise in dealing with the idiosyncrasies of the SL
platform. Moreover, they had also developed agile structures that allowed them to constantly adapt to the
environment that was at the mercy of LL’s governance.
Influence of LL’s Governance on the In-World Economy
SL was regulated by LL through changes to its Terms of Service which participants agreed to adhere to during the
SL signup process. These regulations concerned the presentation and behavior of avatars and the commercial
activities in which they engaged. Many changes to SL’s Terms of Service were made over the years to bring in-world
activities into compliance with various international laws. As a result, many businesses that made up large portions
of the SL economy became regulated or were banned. Changes to the SL platform sometimes also resulted in
certain business activities becoming irrelevant. Losses suffered by SL entrepreneurs due to such changes in
regulations were normally not compensated for by LL.
For example, in December 2005, LL decided to allow avatars to bypass telehubs, which were points where avatars
gathered when moving from one region to another. This caused large upheavals in the SL land prices, leading to
cascading effects on the rental and property development markets. In her interview, Anshe Chung explained:
… the telehub situation was big mistake where Linden Lab screwed up in many ways. Basically, they
acted like a government that decides to build one big dam and flood one city. However, they finally
realized what they did and changed their policies. They made a buyback offer for devalued land. That
way we still all took some loss, but within what one can call acceptable business risk [Hof, 2006].
In another intervention of far-reaching consequences, LL banned in-world gambling activities in July 2007. Many
virtual corporations went out of business, and the SL economy halved in size. The economic damage was not
restricted to businesses that provided direct gambling services. Many virtual banks were faced with liquidity
problems and became victims of bank runs. In August 2007, a virtual bank named Ginko Financial, which was
running a pyramid scheme, collapsed as a result of a run triggered by the gambling ban. Account holders lost over
USD 750,000 in the collapse of this single bank, leading to calls for greater regulation of in-world banking [Gardiner,
2007; Hsu, 2008]. Consequently, in January 2008, LL cracked down on unregulated in-world banking activities by
banning interest payments on cash deposits. Within a month, the SL banking industry ceased to exist. All purely
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virtual banks either closed down or converted into virtual joint stock companies. A few companies that offered zerointerest deposit accounts to avatars remained.
Influence of LL’s Technology Decisions on the In-World Economy
Over the years, LL introduced technological changes that inadvertently stimulated social and economic changes in
the world. SL was comprised of many servers operated by LL and an open source client application that was
executed on each individual participant’s computer. In order to reduce the load on the servers, all object-related data
were stored in a separate asset server cluster. Limited data transfer between the region servers and the assets
servers often caused lagged interactions and led to downtimes. In these downtimes, residents were advised not to
create or sell objects, essentially halting economic activity in that period of time.
One of LL’s core missions was to use open source applications and to eventually publish the server application code
and the client as open source. In addition, the servers ran on the open source operating system Debian Linux. The
use of open source code in the application allowed external parties to reverse engineer some SL functionalities. As a
result, customized versions of the open source client software were available online. Externally developed clients
provided earlier bug fixes (i.e., Nicolaz Edition), customized user interfaces (i.e., Electric Sheep’s OnRez viewer)
and viewers designed for mobile use of SL (i.e., Vollee mobile access). The external clients not only attracted new
users but also allowed existing users to have a better SL experience.
However, the availability of the source code also led to negative consequences. CopyBot was a program originally
written by the LL-supported libsecondlife open source project. It was designed to debug objects and scripts and to
back them up. However, it was soon abused to copy objects without regard for their assigned digital rights. Many
residents complained that their objects had been illegally copied and protested in SL by shuttering their businesses.
LL did not ban the program itself. Rather, LL updated its Terms of Services and threatened to ban users employing
the program for illicit purposes. For legal action it referred affected owners to file a takedown notice under the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act. Only a few in-world businesses had the financial resources to file lawsuits. While these
lawsuits ultimately awarded compensation for the original owners, many small businesses felt unprotected and
hesitated to do further business in SL.
Many businesses felt they were at the mercy of LL’s decisions to change policies and technologies at will. While LL
openly communicated changes before they took place, the economic impact was not always foreseeable. But with
SL being the largest virtual economy and the substantial investments made by in-world businesses, there simply
was not an alternative other than to keep adjusting to the ever-changing environment.

IV. VIRTUALCIRCLE
VirtualCircle (VC) was an in-world service provider, and its target market was all SL users who had a need for virtual
goods and services. The company was founded by Stuart in 2006 to seize entrepreneurial opportunities in SL. While
initially focused on virtual land development, VC soon became known for its agility to adapt to new opportunities and
for being a pioneer in various business and technology niches in SL. VC was recognized for its deep understanding
of the SL platform and associated technologies, knowledge of the in-world business environment, and ability to
leverage its relationships with the SL community.

Company Background
In its early days, SL was a fairly bleak place. SL was a platform that depended on user creations, such as virtual
goods and lands, to make it an interesting space for users to spend their time. Residents were able to search either
goods or places created by other residents. However, due to the fragmentation of the virtual land and the lack of
search capabilities to find like-minded residents, early adopters were frustrated by the initial virtual experience (refer
to Appendix C for a short description of the user experience in 2006). Stuart was one of the early residents of SL. He
soon realized both the shortcomings of the SL experience and the potential of SL as an entrepreneurial platform. He
founded VC in 2006 primarily to fill the residents’ needs to find like-minded peers. Instead of creating a search
capability for residents, Stuart decided to leverage the existing engines and to develop virtual gathering spots that
would be tailored to the tastes and needs of residents.

Initial Business Models
For its first venture, VC leased a parcel of land and started developing a space similar to a real-world night club.
Since there were only a few virtual architects in SL at the time, Stuart designed the gathering spot himself, creating
objects and controlling their interactive behavior, storing the created objects and assembling them into the gathering
spot. There were fifteen basic building shapes or ―prims‖ to choose from. The prims could be edited in form, shape,
color, and texture to resemble real-life objects. The objects then could be saved in the creator’s inventory. The
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creator could duplicate any objects in the inventory, use them for multiple projects, or sell them to interested parties
3
that wanted to use them for their own developments [Curtis, 2008]. The design process did not require
programming experience, as it was supported by a graphical user interface. However, creating interactive objects
required knowledge of object-oriented programming language. The behavior of objects was coded in the Linden
Scripting Language (LSL) that had syntax similar to C. Despite the similarities to standard programming languages,
LSL suffered from its proprietary nature. There was hardly any documentation on LSL and standard features such as
data type declaration, library mechanisms, or dynamic evaluation were not supported [Lee, 2007]. Thus, the
development took much longer than expected and involved many trials and errors. Stuart later reflected:
The SL interface was a disaster. It was fairly easy to create the prims and skins. But making the passive
active was a different story. There was no documentation or support for LSL. We would program scripts
hoping that the LSL backend would accept our code and execute it. If it didn’t, we would start again. Over
time we tapped into the community of SL coders and collectively started to understand the idiosyncrasies
of LSL. In retrospect, we probably were just very early adopters. Most issues we faced were resolved and
documented by 2007. Yet, I still think that we managed to learn the principles of SL. It shows in our
scripts. We still can do things that others can’t.
After the success of the first gathering spot, Stuart used the experience gained to develop more gathering spots and
virtual commercial lease spaces. The gathering spots earned revenue through strategically placed in-world
advertising boards. The commercial lease spots were modeled after stores and malls and mainly earned revenues
4
from leasing fees. While the business model was cash flow positive, generating post-tax profits of nearly L$ 2.9
million in the fourth quarter of 2006, the margins began to decrease due to increased land development after the
widely publicized success of Anshe Chung, the availability of skilled residents that could develop professional
gathering spots, and the decreasing cost of land due to oversupply by LL. The popularity of SL became a doubleedged sword: More residents meant more potential business for the gathering spots, but the popularity also meant
more competition.
Virtual Retailing
Stuart realized in the spring of 2007 that the original business model was not scalable and started looking for
different business opportunities. He also recognized that behavior of the residents had changed. Rather than
designing their avatars to shape their virtual identity, residents started to buy clothes and accessories designed by
other residents to express themselves. Instead of relying on third parties to pay advertising fees for users coming to
the gathering spots, Stuart focused on generating revenues directly from the consumers. In April 2007, VC ventured
into virtual retailing. It initially offered virtual furniture products and soon added designer items, such as clothing, and
accessories lines in its own store. Instead of designing products itself, VC contracted successful in-world designers
and offered their products on a commission basis. As business picked up, VC started developing numerous
specialty stores and housed them in virtual malls. Stuart remembered the situation in August 2007:
At the time I ran a store and we had over 100 locations in SL. Most were profitable, some were not and
we closed them. I evaluated everything at the end of each rent cycle and decided what to keep and what
not to, based on a number of factors. It seemed each month I had at least 5–10 malls that would close up,
disappear or remodel on me. Some made things right by giving refunds and some just went away, taking
my rent money with them. I guess this is part of why I don’t pay more than 4 weeks ahead. It limits my risk
to these things. This is just a part of business and accepting it as a cost of doing business and writing it
off is really all you can do. As for returning things, if a place accidently returned my setup once, I would
give them a second chance. If it happened more than once, something was wrong and it was time to
move on.
But as with the gathering spots, running multiple stores soon became a cost concern. Apart from the leasing cost,
labor cost for store associates started to accrue. While labor was generally cheap, the costs were not scalable
across stores. Moreover, all commercial transactions were facilitated through Stuart’s avatar, which caused hours of
manual payment processing. Although the virtual retailing in stores and malls did not become the sustainable, highmargin business Stuart had hoped for, he did credit their first ventures with many learning experiences. He was
particularly proud of his grasp on the behavior of the residents and his understanding of how to direct his offerings to
his target consumers. He later commented on the key lessons learned:
First, make sure the place fits your demographic. Selling niche items in a vanilla mall doesn’t work any
better generally than selling mainstream items in a nice place. I’m not saying it can’t work, [it] just has to
do with odds of success. Second, big traffic means nothing! Camping [inactive avatars that might have
3
4

Curtis [2008] provides an excellent overview and link to tutorial of how to build in SL.
Income earned in SL is subject to taxation when it is monetized by converting L$ into real world currency.

Volume 29
386

Article 21

been placed there by the property owner] is fake traffic that serves no purpose other than to scam you,
the renter, out of a few weeks rent until you realize there are no sales to be made and move on. When I
see a place with a lot of camping, I generally pass. I don’t care what their traffic numbers are; after all,
more campers means more traffic but not necessarily more sales. Third, the rents have to make sense. I
have a very good feel for market rents with all the stores we have, so when I priced the rental spots at my
places, each of which gets 30–40k daily traffic score without campers, I probably underpriced compared
to a lot of places out there. If you can make enough sales to justify a high rent, great. The problem is that
most places, especially those that are camper heavy and asking high rents due to high traffic scores,
won’t cover it. I find that [with] the cheaper rent places with good quality, no camper traffic easily covers
their rents.
Vending Systems and Virtual Sales Affiliate Program
Stuart soon started questioning the dependence on virtual real estate and paid sales associates as a requirement for
the virtual retailing model. He first experimented with vending machines that would be placed across SL to sell VC’s
products. Although successful—the vending program generated nearly L$ 1 million in post-tax profits in the first
quarter of 2007, Stuart was still dissatisfied with paying rent for the machines, with the lack of tracking systems and
with the limited customer service that vending machines could offer. He later recalled:
Our system needed to be upgraded to allow us to more efficiently track every rental box in one place so
things weren’t accidently returned and we could know exactly who had paid and for how long, without
running around to every box or trying to decipher a huge list being spit out of an in-world server.
Thus, he came up with a radical idea: There should not be any variable cost of selling virtual goods. On the
procurement side, VC had already been able to become an intermediary that would facilitate the sales of virtual
goods in exchange for a commission. Stuart imagined that VC could create a similar model on the sales side. Similar
to Amazon.com with its seller’s marketplace, Stuart decided to put his customers to work.
The sales affiliate program was supposed to enable every resident to resell goods procured by VC. There were a
few off-the-shelf solutions that promised to aid in the distributed sales process. JEVN was the early provider of a
simple server script that would allow a content owner to sell at different locations in SL. The system consisted of the
JEVN Server which held the inventory of items and the JEVN Vendor application which allowed individuals to display
selected items hosted on the server in virtual vending machines. The JEVN script was designed for individuals to
sell only a few products across different places. However, Stuart sourced from over 100 manufacturers of virtual
goods and envisioned the products to be sold by thousands of individual vendors. In its early versions, JEVN was
not capable of dealing with the complexity of Stuart’s operations and often crashed for days at a time. Stuart sought
a more reliable application that would manage the digital assets and properly interface with SL. He realized that
there was a need for a proper application programming interface (API) so VC could customize the sales affiliate
script to their needs. He later reflected on the switch from JEVN to the more enterprise-focused HippoVend system
(HV):
When I used the JEVN system, I lost a lot of business. My vendors that were online could neither develop
nor sell the products. I couldn’t add new stores or products, nor could I finish setting up my affiliate
system. It was very irritating and did cost me sales. JEVN was one disaster after another. Every time the
server locked up on me, I had to change it out and update dozens of vendors with the new server key.
When I switched to Hippo, I discovered half a dozen vendors that appeared online but were really seized
up and another 3 that were offline but the server didn’t reflect that.
Customizing the HV platform to VC’s needs posed a new programming challenge. There was a need for software
that could control the sales process to enforce the property rights of the original creators and VC, and to ensure that
sales affiliates would be properly reimbursed for their sales. Instead of hiring additional programmers in-house,
Stuart decided to rely on the skills of the SL community.
From its beginning, VC had only a small in-house staff that programmed the initial ad placement and the sales
affiliate systems. Stuart focused on formulating the requirements for the systems and finding talented residents to
implement the systems. Stuart understood that residents were eager to program and showcase their skills. For
many, programming in SL was a hobby, not a job. Thus, many would work for a comparatively small stipend,
accepting less than L$ 600 per hour as an adequate reimbursement (see APPENDIX A for the post-tax profits of
VirtualCircle).
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Organization
By the end of 2008, VC had more than 200 virtual employees. Aside from the three employees in VC’s real-world
Atlanta office, all other employees were working and communicating through SL. VC was a truly global company
with employees on every inhabitable continent on the planet. Most of the employees were object and systems
designers who were hired directly in SL. In the majority of the cases, Stuart knew only the name of their avatars, not
the true identity of the employed residents. Since Stuart made sure that all of his contactors and employees were
paid on time, many of his freelancers signed up to work on further projects. Managing the different teams also had
its drawbacks. Stuart said:
Working with individuals in-world, it can’t be ―work‖ and it’s difficult to impose real world scheduling, and
what might be considered business. Managing people in SL, involves ensuring that ―workers‖ stay in the
illusion of doing a hobby rather than actually working. The salaries are comparatively small; however,
between the social and the monetary value, it is a ―profitable‖ job.
The organization was an early example of an institution that was truly agile. There were no headquarters or large
overheads. Employees were hired based on their skills, independent of their identity, background, or geographic
location. Employment was project-based, and labor became an exchangeable commodity within the organization
that could be scaled based on the demands of a given project. Thus, VC was a temporary organization that used the
programmer network of SL to quickly adjust its workforce to implement projects.
In a typical recruitment process for designers, Stuart would scout SL for innovative or new designs and would track
down the creator. He would offer to rebrand the assets and sell them through VC’s stores and sales affiliate program
and negotiate a commission. The standard commission was usually between 30 percent and 40 percent, but varied
greatly based on the experience of the resident and the creator’s valuation of their own work. VC was also active in
commissioning work that might become a new fashion trend or sought-after accessory. They would either ask
existing partners to design the products or request services via the SL classifieds.
Stuart also tried to leverage the in-world business community to expand the influence of VC. As a founding member
of the SL Chamber of Commerce, Stuart knew most of the business owners in SL. He estimated that he personally
5
knew 80 percent of the roughly 600 account holders that were considered sustainable businesses. He organized
regular chamber meetings, where responses to and recommendations for policy changes by LL were discussed.
While there were some successful actions taken (e.g., the protest against CopyBot), such jointly coordinated efforts
to change disadvantageous policy decisions by LL were the exception rather than the norm.

V. STATUS
The virtual organization and the constant adaptation to the turbulent environment yielded impressive results for VC.
In less than three years, Stuart had developed six business lines, five of which were still active and profitable. VC
leased out 250 commercial spaces, with a vacancy rate of only 12 percent. It had one virtual flagship store and more
than 300 vending systems that operated across SL. In addition, there were over 1,000 sales affiliates who sold VCbranded products to their peers. VC had become an in-world brand that residents trusted. On an average day, 5,000
residents either bought items or spent money in the gathering spots. Overall, Stuart felt good about VC’s
accomplishments and was certain that the next business opportunity was just around the corner.
The email reminder jolted Stuart out of his reverie. He gazed at Patailani one last time and then teleported to the
virtual office of VC. His daily virtual debriefing with his offshore design team was scheduled in the conference room.
Spotting Linyette, the cat-shaped avatar of his assistant, he walked briskly toward her. Taking her aside, he asked
her to schedule a meeting of the core strategy team of VC and handed her the draft agenda. It read:
When we started VC, we placed a real-life business into SL, and soon realized that real world business
constraints do not hold in SL. The natural laws of commerce are non-existent in SL—the laws are
repainted frequently and the paint is not even dry and is subject to change! Thus, we dealt away with the
constrained real world business model and developed a business model based on constant change. The
world is constantly changing around us; in real-life the rate of change is slow, in SL the rate of change is
accelerated! Let us meet to think about the future of VC, consider options for its sustainability and growth
and identify the direction we wish to travel in.
Stuart wondered about the suggestions his strategy team would propose. There were various questions for them to
consider. Should they rediscover their real-life business model and transcend VC into the real world or should they
5
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enter other virtual worlds? What had VC learned from its SL business, and what had been the drivers of its success?
Was it possible to replicate these drivers in other virtual worlds or in the real world? Ruminating over these questions
and his experiences, Stuart flew into the conference room, starting another day of making real money in a virtual
world.
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APPENDIX A: POST-TAX PROFIT AND LOSS STATEMENT OF VIRTUAL CIRCLE

Quarter
Land
Development
Gathering
Spots
Commercial
Lease Spots
Stores
Vending
Program
Sales
Affiliates
Quarterly
Total
Annual Total

Table A-1: Virtual Circle’s Profit and Loss Statement ($L ’000)
2006
2007
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1

2008
Q2
Q3

Q4

-6,900

1,800

2,250

1,650

750

9,000

800

540

459

458

500

398

0

-960

150

228

240

276

255

240

225

270

303

318

0 -1,680

-630

-15

738

1,935 2,157 1,965 2,034

1,896

0 -2,400 -1,650

372

402

0

0

0

651

942

0

0

0

0

0

-6,900 -3,240

120

1,617 1,869

639

645

657

1,269 1,296 1,197

966

1,095

336

1,023 1,770 2,610 3,006

3,600

2,886 3,072 12,057 4,931

5,601 6,513 7,139 7,454

7,964

-7,134

330

468

1,101 1,203
-267

594

606

25,661

29,070

APPENDIX B: SL DATA6

Year
2006
2006
2006
2007
2007
2007
2007
2008
2008
2008
2008

Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4

Year
2006
2006
2007
2007
2007
2007
2008
2008
2008
2008

Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4

Table B-1: In-World Businesses’ Profits
(Accounts with Positive Monthly L$ Flow Grouped by Quarter and Income Level in USD)
< 10
10–50
50–100
100–200
200–500
500–1K
1K–2K
2 –5K
USD
USD
USD
USD
USD
USD
USD
USD
8,580
5,740
1,654
1,213
1,031
443
276
158
14,140
7,570
2,069
1,533
1,411
607
342
218
22,383
11,529
3,115
2,410
2,057
902
568
326
41,484
20,988
5,312
4,043
3,598
1,513
941
677
61,960
31,657
7,650
5,643
4,905
2,018
1,207
836
69,813
37,632
8,936
6,369
5,313
2,091
1,264
859
76,645
43,987
9,829
6,924
5,803
2,522
1,419
941
88,689
49,195
10,959
7,182
6,189
2,659
1,514
1,007
91,397
51,271
10,961
7,380
6,646
2,895
1,629
1,102
97,879
54,170
11,554
7,472
6,867
2,965
1,778
1,246
100,939
51,833
10,714
7,322
6,580
2,921
1,761
1,151

1–
500 L$
33,295
155,601
325,490
400,124
391,699
402,351
377,228
452,107
485,164
505,204

501–
2K L$
13,390
58,922
98,838
135,764
150,119
164,546
185,905
191,684
204,767
222,317

Table B-2: In-World Resident Spending
2K–
5K–
10K–
50K–
100K–
5K L$
10K L$
50K L$
100K L$ 500K L$
10,854
7,975
13,462
2,759
1,992
44,638
32,149
55,001
11,411
8,766
71,569
51,714
91,984
20,103
18,047
127,356
70,317 124,019
26,001
23,303
114,517
79,349 129,922
27,995
22,039
128,363
89,698 149,039
31,242
22,830
141,816 100,100 168,938
36,291
25,512
146,811 103,284 178,642
39,290
28,547
154,772 109,959 193,749
43,815
30,621
159,896 112,768 195,527
41,213
28,154

> 5K
USD
87
106
189
365
410
412
469
476
550
656
597

500K–
> 1000K
1000K L$
L$
169
155
907
806
2,128
1,911
2,865
2,577
2,266
1,617
1,960
1,230
2,121
1,342
2,237
1,543
2,490
1,953
2,442
1,989

Table B-3: Average Exchange Rate
2006
2007
2008
Quarter
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
L$ to 1 USD 278.73 315.20 293.19 272.59 268.87 268.8 268.57 268.44 268.17 267.34 267.00 266.07

6

All data compiled from SL economics data available at http://secondlife.com/whatis/economy_stats.php.
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In-World Economy
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Figure B-1. SL Economy

Inworld Money Supply and Out Flow
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Figure B-2. SL Money Supply and USD Exchanged
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Figure B-3. SL Usage
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Figure B-4. Land Ownership in SL
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APPENDIX C: USER EXPERIENCE DURING THE EARLY DAYS OF SL (CIRCA 2006)
In early 2006, SL had between 5,000 and 10,000 concurrent users online. However, those residents were scattered
across the virtual world, unsuccessfully trying to find like-minded peers. They had the ability to search for popular
places, but were unable to find specific residents that matched their interests. In addition, many popular spots were
private islands that could not be accessed without the permission of the owner. An early adopter described her
experience as:
I flew, and flew and saw a bunch of empty houses and buildings. There wasn’t a soul anywhere.... Finally,
I decided to click on the button that said ―find‖ and asked for the most popular places. It told me there was
free money at so and so. I tried teleporting there but it told me the space was full so I couldn’t. I figured if
it was that full it must be a really happenin’ spot. So I flew there.… During my overly long flight there, I
saw absolutely nothing of interest except a bunch of billboards and more buildings. Seriously, there
wasn’t a soul in sight. This game is popular, right? [Ingrid, 2006].
The SL experience was affected by lags, or delayed responses to user commands. This resulted in erratic behavior
of the avatar or environment. Lags were caused by the concentration of multiple avatars in a single region or when
servers were flooded by requests to manipulate inventory. Inadequate hardware at the user end also caused lags
and crashes of the software. Bug fixes and performance updates were thus regularly released by LL. These multiple
updates also resulted in increasing the complexity of the SL platform.
Moreover, users were not satisfied with the experience as a whole. SL had high-end hardware and bandwidth
requirements, leading to slow rendering and choppy movement, rather than smooth navigation in a 3-D virtual
space. In addition, the slow rendering severely interfered with user-to-user interaction. Long wait times caused users
to have SL load in the background, leaving their avatars idle for a long time. Another early adopter recalls:
Here’s my usual SL experience—Log in. wait for everything around me to load. Keep waiting. Finally
loads, try to move, no luck. Keep trying. Keep having no luck ... check the map to try and find some
people. OK, there’s some. Teleport there. Oh, that’s a private zone that I can’t get to, so instead I’ve been
teleported off to this other place where no one is.... Finally get some place where there are other people.
They are all away or talking about scripts. I try to talk to several of them. No one ever responds [Bonner,
2006].
Despite the less-than-ideal user experiences, more than 180,000 users had become residents by spring 2006.
Approximately 10,000 of the registered residents held premium accounts paying recurring fees to LL to lease their
own piece of the SL mainland or entire islands. While many premium users just wanted to own their own space in
SL, there were also quite a few entrepreneurs that saw a wealth of business opportunities in the virtual space. The
early experiences of Anshe Chung, SL’s self-made millionaire, were also far from ideal. In a virtual interview, she
described her initial experience:
I read about SL on Terranova [a blog about virtual worlds]. Then I took a look at this seemingly hopeless
little thingy. I logged in and it looked like an empty and dead place, incredible laggy [slow], clumsy, and
ugly. And besides that, it seemed really pointless [Hof, 2006].
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